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Abstract: 
Neutral Theory is controversial in ecology. Ecologists and philosophers have diagnosed the 
source of the controversy as: its false assumption that individuals in different species within the 
same trophic level are ecologically equivalent, its conflict with Competition Theory and the 
adaptation of species, its role as a null hypothesis, and as a Lakatosian research programme. In 
this paper, I show why we should instead understand the conflict at the level of research 
programs which involve more than theory. The Neutralist and Competitionist research programs 
borrow and construct theories, models, and experiments for various aims and given their home 
ecological systems. I present a holistic and pragmatic view of the controversy that foregrounds 
the interrelation between many kinds of practices and decisions in ecological research.  
 
1. Introduction 
Stephen Hubbell’s 2001 The Unified Neutral Theory of Biodiversity and Biogeography 
instigated a controversy among community ecologists. This paper investigates how we should 
understand what is controversial about Neutral Theory. I aim to identify the root of the 
controversy to illuminate the organization of scientific research. Neutral Theory is neutral 
because it idealizes away any differences between individuals of any species and hypothesizes 
that chance and history structure communities. Hubbell developed Neutral Theory to oppose the 
focus on the roles of competition between species in shaping ecological communities. Ecologists 
have understood the controversy in a variety of ways, but they have centered on the neutrality 
assumption and its conflict with Competition Theory.  
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 After discussing the controversy in the literature, I argue against focusing on the 
propositions of Neutral Theory because this ignores how ecologists use and develop theories 
further.  I take David Tilman’s Resource Ratio Theory as an example of a Competition Theory 
and I show how both Hubbell and Tilman intertwined their theoretical program with an empirical 
program to further their aims. Drawing on the history of Hubbell and Tilman’s programs, I build 
towards a holistic and pragmatic understanding of the conflicts between Neutralist and 
Competitionist Research Programs. Research programs coordinate theorizing, modeling, and 
experimenting to respond productively to however the world responds to their probing. Theory 
bias leads us to either analyze static theories or foreground theorizing and backgrounding other 
practices, both of which limit the ways scholars of science and scientists themselves see 
controversies in science. Neutral Theory is controversial in part because it assumes something 
that is false and in opposition to other accepted theories. But stepping back, this false assumption 
plays a crucial role in structuring the Neutralist Research Program and ties the theorizing and 
modeling to the empirical study of tropical rain forests. Competitionists organize their research 
programs to investigate the world in other ways, for other aims, and based on other parts of the 
world. The controversy stems from these alternative ways of organizing overlapping research.  
 
2. The Neutralist-Competitionist Controversy 
Hubbell’s Neutral Theory hypothesizes that three processes structure single trophic level 
community abundance patterns: drift (random birth and death), dispersal, and speciation. It 
assumes that all individuals, regardless of species, are functionally equivalent in how these 
processes affect them. Neutral Theory is formalized into mathematical models and used to make 
predictions about patterns tracking the number of species and individuals across space and time.  
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To be controversial, a thing must show promise and it must provoke conflict. Ecologists 
responded to Hubbell’s work on Neutral Theory in a variety of ways. Hubbell showed that 
neutral models describe the abundance patterns of trees in tropical forests especially well. Many 
ecologists performed normal scientific applications of the neutral model to a variety of 
communities from rotifers (Beres, Wallace, and Segers 2005), to grasslands (Harpole and Tilman 
2006), to birds (McGill 2003). These comparisons yielded a range of model fits, with some 
dramatic claims to have refuted the theory with coral reef data (Dornelas, Connolly, and Hughes 
2006).  
In targeting the controversy, some focus on a tension between the falsity of the neutrality 
assumption and its empirical success. “This neutral theory has already sparked some controversy 
in the literature and has inspired many studies. Although the theory’s predictions seem consistent 
with much empirical data, how can such a theory, with assumptions that are so obviously wrong, 
be useful?” (de Mazancourt 2001, 1772). “Hubbell’s ‘Unified Neutral Theory of Biodiversity 
and Biogeography’ (UNTB) has generated much controversy about both the realism of its 
assumptions and how well it describes the species abundance dynamics in real communities” 
(Mutshinda, O'Hara, and Woiwod 2008, 340). Not everyone expects false models to be useful. 
Others focus on the conflict between what Neutral Theory and Competition Theory 
hypothesize about the world. According to Competition Theory, patterns of abundance and 
diversity result from the ongoing war between differentially adapted species competing for 
limited resources, the most abundance species being the best adapted to the given resources 
(Weber 1999). Several authors pointed out the conflict between Hubbell and Darwin’s emphasis 
on adaptive divergence between species (Alonso, Etienne, and McKane 2006, Leigh 2007). 
Neutral Theory encouraged other ecologists to update and repackage Competition Theory (Chase 
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and Leibold 2003).  
Still other see the controversy with Competition Theory as methodological. One way of 
framing the controversy portrays Neutral Theory as a statistical null hypothesis (Yu, Terborgh, 
and Potts 1998, Linquist et al. 2015, Bausman and Halina 2018, Odenbaugh forthcoming). 
Hubbell himself slipped into this at times, “At the very least, neutral theory will remain a rich 
source of quantitative null hypotheses about the dynamics of ecological communities across 
multiple spatial and temporal scales” (Hubbell 2006, 1338). Graham Bell distinguished between 
the strong and weak versions or uses of neutral models (Bell 2001). The Weak interpretation 
holds that neutral models supply the null hypothesis for testing for whether ecologists should 
accept Competition Theory’s hypotheses about communities. When Neutral Theory supplies the 
null hypothesis in this way, they must neutral hypotheses before accepting competition 
hypotheses. As this is a strong position to be in, this threatens Competition Theory and its users. 
The Strong interpretation of Neutral Theory holds that neutral models supply alternative causal 
hypotheses on a par with those from competition models and cannot undermine the causal 
relevance of competition. Here Neutral Theory is in conflict only with the often-assumed greater 
strength of competition over drift, dispersal, and speciation.  
Another response to the Neutral Theory emphasizes that both it and Competition Theory 
should continue to develop as research programs (Chave 2004). Neutralists looked forward to 
what could yet be done with Neutral Theory (Alonso, Etienne, and McKane 2006, Rosindell, 
Hubbell, and Etienne 2011). Others proposed syntheses of both theories (Vellend 2010). 
Recently, some ecologists even argued for why Neutral Theory is at the center of a degenerate 
Lakatosian research programme while Competition Theory’s programme is progressive (Ale et 
al. 2019).  
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While this controversy continues to shift, Neutral Theory continues to occupy ecologists 
with normal science and has earned a place in community ecology textbooks (Morin 2009). To 
begin to understand more deeply, let me introduce Neutral Theory and Competition Theory in 
detail. 
 
Neutral Theory 
The basic Neutral Theory Hubbell presents in his 2001 book works as follows. Neutral Theory is 
a theory of single trophic level patterns such as relative species abundance distributions (SADs), 
how SADs vary in space and time, and species-area curves. Focusing on single trophic levels 
removes interactions such as predation and parasitism. SADs record the number of individuals in 
each species in a community. Neutral Theory hypothesizes that abundance patterns result from 
just three processes acting on standing abundance: drift, dispersal, and speciation. It assumes 
saturation, that communities maintain a constant size, and neutrality, that all individuals, 
regardless of species, have the same ecological rates. Under these assumptions individuals have 
identical chances of dying, giving birth, immigrating, and being a member of the new species 
and that individuals compete as equals for space, interspecific competition being no different 
from intraspecific competition. Neutral Theory models community dynamics with a local 
community which receives immigrants from a metacommunity. Under drift alone, the local 
community diversity will decrease over time as species go locally extinct. In the local 
community, dispersal introduces migrants of novel species from the metacommunity and 
balances drift. In the metacommunity, speciation balances drift. The models are stochastic, 
individual-based models with 3 free parameters: local community size, immigration rate, and 
biodiversity number (a function of metacommunity size and speciation rate).  
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Neutral Theory carries on several traditions of theorizing in ecology and other biological 
sciences.1 First, tropical forest ecology explored how lottery processes structure tropical forests 
(Connell 1978) Hubbell’s first two papers on the ancestor of Neutral Theory are tropical forest 
ecology papers (Hubbell 1979, Hubbell and Foster 1986). Second, MacArthur and Wilson’s 
Theory of Island Biogeography modeled species richness and species-area relations as the 
balance of immigration and extinction (MacArthur and Wilson 1963, 1967). Island 
Biogeography remains a foundational theory in community ecology. Third, Hubbell drew results 
and inspiration from the Neutral Theory of molecular evolution (Kimura 1968, Caswell 1976) 
and the MBL model of clade diversity (Raup and Gould 1974), both of which use analogous 
processes (Hubbell 1979, 2005). Graham Bell also published on neutral models when Hubbell 
was preparing his book (Bell 2000, 2001).  
 
Competition Theory 
Competition Theory is a broader class of theories in ecology that all model the effects of 
interspecific competition between differentially adapted species. One exemplar of a competition 
theory is David Tilman’s Resource Ratio Theory and I will use this as an exemplar (Tilman 
1982). Resource Ratio, also called R* “R-Star” Theory, is a mechanistic model of competition 
between species for limited resources. R* Theory targets community abundance data and 
resource-species correlations. R* Theory assumes that each species has a minimum level of a 
resource (the R* Value) below which it cannot maintain a constant population size. The theory 
then hypothesizes that when two species compete for a limited resource, the species with the 
smaller R* value for that resource will exclude the other. In the simplest case, 2 species will 
 
1 An extended analysis of the origins of neutral theory is found in (Bausman 2016, Chs. 1 & 2). 
 7 
coexist if there are for 2 limiting resources and neither has smaller R* values for both resources. 
R* Theory models deterministic, population-level models with 2 free parameters for the 
population size and resource level of every resource-species pair modeled.  
There is a long tradition of theorizing based on interspecific competition theory in 
ecology. Darwin’s struggle for existence is about the competitive interactions of species with 
each other and their environments in evolution. The competitive exclusion principle has been an 
organizing principle of competition theory (Weber 1999). It states that if species in the same 
region utilize too similar of resources, one will come to exclude the other. Grinnell proposed this 
principle for field work on birds (Grinnell 1904) and Gause for laboratory experiments on 
paramecium (Gause 1932). Competitive exclusion is also stated using the concept of the niche 
and Niche Theory is another name for the approach. The modern niche concept includes the 
environmental conditions and interactions with other animals from both Grinnell (Grinnell 1917) 
and Elton (Elton 1927). Hutchinson formalized the notions of the fundamental and realized 
niches (Hutchinson 1957) and this led to a tradition in understanding coexistence in terms of the 
limiting similarity of niches (MacArthur and Levins 1967). Lotka and Volterra developed simple 
competition-based models (Lotka 1925, Volterra 1926). Robert MacArthur developed their 
approach further into a theory of the relationship between growth rates and resource levels 
(MacArthur 1972). R* Theory extends this line of development. Jared Diamond proposed the 
concept of assembly rules to explain co-occurrence patterns of birds in an archipelago based on 
interspecific competition and niches (Diamond 1975).  
Neutral Theory and Competition Theory are both theories of the diversity and abundance 
of ecological communities, but they target overlapping patterns. Both aim to predict and explain 
the number of species for example, but Neutral Theory is targeted at biogeographic patterns of 
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how relative abundances vary in space and time whereas Competition Theory is targeted at the 
correlations between resource and species abundances. Put another way, Neutral Theory is more 
interested in larger biogeographic scale patterns while Competition Theory is more interested in 
local landscape scale patterns. When they both target SADs, their predictions need not be distinct 
depending on the details of the models. This produces an underdetermination of theory by data 
problem (Purves and Pacala 2005). However, the theories are not strongly underdetermined but 
make different predictions for other patterns (McGill et al. 2007).  
 
3. How Not to Understand the Controversy 
There are four temping ways to understand the Neutralist-Competitionist Controversy in 
ecology that we should resist. First, Neutral Theory is not controversial because ecologists know 
its neutrality assumption is false.  The neutrality assumption was a strong early target of 
criticism. As the editors noted in their introduction to a special issue of Ecology focused on 
Neutral Theory, “Most ecologists regard the assumption of all species being equivalent as highly 
unrealistic...” (Holyoak, Loreau, and Strong Jr 2006). Some still see a tension between empirical 
success and false assumptions. But neutrality is just one assumption in a discipline with many 
idealizations and abstractions. Ecologists love to quote George Box’s “All models are false, 
some are useful” (Box and Draper 1987). Different communities satisfy neutrality to different 
degrees. The important question is the degree to which species differences matter to patterns of 
abundance, which is just what Hubbell asked. That species differ is obvious; that these 
differences are responsible is not. Many ecologists believe that they are responsible because of 
the widely accepted empirical support for Competition Theory and the importance of natural 
selection in evolutionary theory. Answering this question means in part measuring the size of the 
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community, the size of the surrounding metacommunity, the dispersal rate from metacommunity 
to local community, and speciation rate in metacommunity. And this is a major departure from 
the dominant way of investigating communities. Competition Theory explains coexistence 
through hypothesizing species differences and its research strategy recommends that coexisting 
species need to be investigated until a relevant difference in how they utilize limiting resources is 
found (Weber 1999).  
Second, while the conflict involves Competition Theory, it is not a conflict at level of 
scientific Theory. The theories conflict with each because they hypothesize that different 
processes are responsible for the observed patterns of abundance. However, this is not the same 
opposition found in classic cases of theory choice such as the Geocentric vs. Heliocentric models 
of the solar system. Here, we cannot reconcile the two models. But we can with Neutral Theory 
and Competition Theory so long as we assume neither is complete. Drift, dispersal, speciation, 
and interspecific competition can all influence abundance patterns at different times or in 
different degrees at the same time. Despite the rhetoric of the controversy, ecologists recognize 
that all four processes change abundance patterns.  
Mark Vellend developed The Theory of Ecological Communities has a theoretical 
unification of Neutral Theory with Competition Theory (Vellend 2010, 2016). Peter Chesson’s 
Coexistence Theory also produces Neutral Theory and R* Theory as special cases (Chesson 
2000). Community ecologists address what John Beatty calls a Relative Significance issue 
(Beatty 1997). They want to determine the relative significance of the processes represented in 
multiple theories within a domain, in this case drift, dispersal, speciation, and interspecific 
competition (Vellend et al. 2014). That Neutral Theory and R* Theory persist through these 
proposals for theoretical unification suggests that both these and the many other partial theories 
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and models in community ecology are each useful for different purposes. If they feel challenged 
by Neutral Theory, it is because ecologists hoped that interspecific competition was always the 
most dominant process.2 But this is an empirical question. 
Third, the Neutral Theory is not primarily in conflict with Competition Theory because 
Neutral Theory supplies the appropriate null hypothesis for testing Competition Theory. The 
history of “null hypotheses” in ecology is a source of tension for Neutral Theory. But Neutral 
Theory is not used in the debate to supply null hypotheses as is portrayed.  
The Null Model Wars raged through the 1970s and 80s. Hubbell put himself into this 
history when he names his theory “neutral” and said it played the role of a “null hypothesis”. The 
Null Model Wars occurred between Jared Diamond and Michael Gilpin on one side and Daniel 
Simberloff, Edward Connor, and Don Strong on the other side. Jared Diamond argued that co-
occurrence data for birds on islands in Melanesia was evidence for the adaptation and 
interspecific competition of the birds and for their ability to resist invaders (Diamond 1975). 
Connor and Simberloff responded with a methodological challenge: to infer interspecific 
competition is responsible for a particular pattern, you need to first “falsify a null hypothesis” 
that the patterns are rather due to chance colonization (Connor and Simberloff 1979, Strong 
1980). This debate raged back and forth through many volleys but had died down by the late 
1980s, though the latest round happened only in 2013-15 (Connor, Collins, and Simberloff 2013, 
2015, Diamond, Pimm, and Sanderson 2015, Odenbaugh forthcoming).  
The Null Model Wars have many lessons for many people. Connor, Simberloff, and later 
Strong’s Popperian justification and misuse of statistical “null hypothesis” language rightly drew 
 
2 One reason for desiring the importance of competition is that it would support the Balance of 
Nature (Egerton 1973). See (Simberloff 1984, 2014) for an elaboration of this argument.  
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criticism (Diamond and Gilpin 1982, Quinn and Dunham 1983, Sloep 1986, Bausman and 
Halina 2018). But they raised the standards of evidence for a hypothesis through testing “null 
hypotheses” through promoting an important new methodology (Gotelli and Graves 1996) and 
promoted processes chancy and historical processes. Connor, Simberloff, and Strong at different 
times presented their null models as only statistical randomizations of existing data and as 
alternative causal models based on dispersal and colonization. The latter tied them to the 
influence of MacArthur and Wilson’s Theory of Island Biogeography and its focus on dispersal 
and colonization (MacArthur and Wilson 1967). 
Hubbell made clear he was on the side of the null modelers. He shared reviewers’ 
comments on papers he published before his 2001 book and they show this was not lost on other 
ecologists, e.g. “Ecology is not ready for yet another null model of community assembly. Let 
sleeping dogs lie.” (Hubbell 2008, 145).  
Bell saw early that the implications of the reemergence and empirical success of neutral 
models in ecology depend on their interpretation and use (Bell 2001). Both Weak and Strong 
uses create tension between Neutral Theory and Competition Theory, but so do in different ways. 
The Weak use of a neutral model is as a null hypothesis for investigating abundance patterns. 
Here a neutral model, null with respect to interspecific competition, is used in conjunction with a 
competition-based model to evaluate whether competition is necessary to explain some data. If 
the neutral model fits the data well-enough, then invoking competition is unnecessary and so 
unwarranted. With the Weak use, Neutral Theory challenges Competition Theory by 
undermining its hypotheses that involve competition. The general threat is that the empirical 
success of neutral models could show that explaining abundance patterns with competition is 
never warranted. This use is weak because it makes no assumptions about the relationship 
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between neutral models and the systems modeled, and it also cannot be used to infer any positive 
support for a hypothesis that invokes neutral drift, dispersal, and speciation. The Strong use of 
Neutral Theory is as a theory of community ecology equal in standing to Competition Theory, 
drift, dispersal, speciation, and competition all taken to be processes causally relevant to 
abundance patterns. With the Strong use, Neutral Theory challenges Competition Theory by 
undermining the importance and strength of interspecific competition on abundance patterns. 
This use is strong because support for Neutral Theory’s assumptions and the empirical success of 
neutral models gives evidence for drift, dispersal, and speciation being important processes 
structuring abundance patterns.  
Ecologists have used Neutral Theory in the Weak way, but it is not the primary use. 
When ecologists draw conclusions about the role of neutral processes from neutral models, they 
adopt the Strong use. And while they often use the rhetoric of “null hypotheses”, their actual 
reasoning does not use statistical null hypothesis testing because they do not employ of statistical 
hypothesis in an experiment (Bausman and Halina 2018). One sign of this is the fact that 
predictions of relative abundances derived from Neutral Theory and Competition Theory are not 
necessarily distinct, making experiments unable to distinguish between them (Sloep 1986, 
Purves and Pacala 2005, Linquist et al. 2015).  
In practice all ecologists including neutralists that interspecific competition is a potential 
cause affecting abundance in any given ecological community. In this way Neutral Theory is not 
used to challenge the core of Competition Theory and the weak, null hypothesis use does not 
account for the source of the controversy raised by Neutral Theory among ecologists in the way 
discussed here.  
Two articles led by philosophers of ecology have addressed the controversy surrounding 
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Neutral Theory. Jay Odenbaugh has argued against the Neutral Theory being “simply a ‘null 
model’” and for interpreting it as a “realistic, explanatory theory”. This means that the neutrality 
assumption is an idealization and that neutral drift, dispersal, and speciation are causally relevant 
to abundance pattern (Odenbaugh forthcoming). In these points we agree.3 Stefan Linquist and 
colleagues have also addressed the source of the controversy surrounding Neutral Theory 
(Linquist et al. 2015). Like Odenbaugh, they consider Neutral Theory as both a null hypothesis 
and an explanatory theory. I agree with their arguments against placing the burden of proof of 
non-neutral models because neutral models are the “default or null hypothesis”. This can neither 
be justified by an appeal to statistics nor to parsimony. Linquist and colleagues also emphasize 
the failure of model-fit of neutral models to SADs to provide sufficient evidence for neutral 
models capturing ecological dynamics. I agree with their philosophical decision to avoid 
answering whether neutral models are in fact explanatory of any ecological systems and with 
their call to seek direct support for the assumptions of Neutral Theory. But this paper goes 
beyond these analyses. As I will argue in the remainder of this paper, I do not agree with 
Odenbaugh and Linquist and colleagues that this controverys can be understood by only 
considering the theories and theoretical methods at play.  
Forth, having accepted that the tension arises from the relationship with Competition 
Theory, that it is not a conflict of clashing Theories, and that the Strong use dominates, we 
 
3 But I do not agree that Hubbell “has opted to think of the neutral theory as a ‘null hypothesis’. 
Hubbell writes this way, but his project in his book and his conclusions in articles, e.g. about the 
importance of neutral dispersal on the BCI SADs based on fits to neutral models (Condit, 
Chisholm, and Hubbell 2012), show that he uses the Strong use and sees neutral theory as a 
realistic, explanatory theory. I also do not agree that the choice between Neutral Theory as null 
hypothesis/model and explanatory theory is exclusive. The Strong and Weak interpretations are 
rather uses of a theory and model and can be used in one way here and the other way there. 
 14 
should move to seeing the controversy at the level of research programs. But we should resist 
understanding the controversy in terms of Lakatosian research programmes. Imre Lakatos 
improved upon Karl Popper’s ideas of falsification to move from static theories to dynamic 
research programmes (Lakatos 1976). Lakatos built his methodology of scientific research 
programmes to explain how scientists can rationally continue to work on a theory after they have 
disconfirmed its hypotheses. Because both Neutral Theory and Competition Theory have 
produced a series of theories and models and continue to be developed, both fit aspects of 
research programmes. In this, the shift from static hypothesis testing to dynamic theoretical 
development is crucial for understanding the controversy and scientific research. Lakatos argued 
that scientists build programmes around a hard core of theoretical claims which are themselves 
insufficient to generate predictions and which they must never modify. Scientists generate 
empirical predictions by adding claims to the auxiliary belt, and it is these claims which they 
may modify make new predictions. Being interested in the rationality of science, Lakatos 
distinguished two ways in which theories can change. Progressive programmes tend to make 
new testable predictions which are confirmed empirically while degenerate programmes do not. 
However, it is only clear in hindsight whether a programme was progressive because all 
programmes must persist through degenerate phases before they become progressive and most 
that end up degenerate had progressive phases.  
The first problem is that Lakatos’ distinction between the hard core and auxiliary belt is 
too rigid to capture most methodologies. Instead of a hard core of theoretical claims, I propose to 
understand the methodologies used in research programs in terms of starting points. Starting 
points are the sets of processes which the scientists begin with at the origin of the research 
program. I use “research program” when I am not using Lakatos’ specific concept. Another kind 
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of relative “starting” point would be the set of processes the scientists begin with at a given stage 
in the development of the program, which may or may not be the same as the original starting 
point. By analogy with methodological Adaptationism in evolution, we find methodological 
Neutralism and Competitionism in ecology. Methodological Adaptationism is the approach to 
investigating biological systems that takes natural selection as its starting point (modified from 
(Godfrey-Smith 2001, 337)).4 Methodological Neutralism is the approach to investigating 
ecological communities that takes the set of drift, dispersal, and speciation as its starting point.5 
Methodological Competitionism is the approach to investigating ecological communities that 
takes interspecific competition as its starting point.  
The Neutralist and Competitionist Research Programs use their starting points to 
investigate the relative significance of drift, dispersal, speciation, and interspecific competition 
with two reasoning strategies: Baseline Modeling and Adding Complexity. Baseline modeling is a 
strategy for apportioning the relative significance of a set processes to a pattern (Bausman 2018). 
Neutralists use the neutral model as their baseline model and Competitionists use their 
competition model as their baseline model. The baseline model’s outputs are compared with 
 
4 Another way to think about adaptationism uses Elizabeth Lloyd’s Logic of Research Questions 
Framework to frame their research questions (Lloyd 2015). She argues that Adaptationists ask, 
"What is the function of this trait?". However, The Logic of Research Questions framework is 
useful for criticizing researchers for failing to investigate all known causes. But it is not useful 
for distinguishing different methodologies each addressing the same relative significance 
problem because each methodology asks the same question, "What is the cause of this?", but 
takes a different approach to answering it. See (Bausman 2019) for the expanded version of this 
argument. 
5 A recent paper argues that the Neutralist research programme is degenerate (Ale et al. 2019). 
Beyond uncritically using Lakatos’ view, the authors misidentify the hard core of the neutralist 
programme as the neutrality assumption. They then argue that because Neutralists relax this 
assumption, the program is degenerate. But their argument does not follow if the hard core is 
identified as drift, dispersal, and speciation. Moreover, both programs use the same strategies to 
move beyond their starting points.  
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abundance curves. To the degree that the baseline model fits the data, the processes represented 
in the baseline model are responsible for the pattern. And deviations from the baseline 
expectations are inferred to be caused by the processes left out of the baseline model. Because no 
model fits all patterns perfectly well, both Neutralists and Competitionists will cite drift, 
dispersal, speciation, and interspecific competition as responsible to different degrees in different 
communities. But they will not necessarily agree on the relative significance of processes in 
particular cases.  
Adding Complexity is a strategy for augmenting a theory or model. Poor model fit can 
also be a sign that either the assumptions of the theory or the formalization of the theory into the 
model need to be changed. The starting point gives direction to how this should be done. For 
example, starting with R* Theory, Tilman developed a stochastic niche theory which 
incorporated drift into resource competition (Tilman 2004). Ecologists working with Neutral 
Theory relaxed neutrality and developed a version of the neutral model that included small 
selective differences between species to reduce the total number of species predicted by the 
model (Rosindell, Harmon, and Etienne 2015). Because their starting points are complementary 
and together include all known processes, both research programs develop models which include 
each process. But they do not necessarily use the modified model in every case going forward 
and they have not converged on a common set of models.  
 
4. How to Understand the Controversy  
The second and more fundamental limitation of Lakatos’ research programmes is their 
theory bias; research programmes include only series of theories and methods for changing them. 
Programs differ is more ways than we can see with theory-biased glasses. Research programs use 
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combinations of theories, models, and experiments to turn data into evidence for hypotheses to 
answer questions. I propose to see the controversy as between the collections of the 
methodological choices made by the Neutralist and Competitionist research programs.  
Some the history of Hubbell and Tilman is useful to understand the epistemic differences 
between their programs. In 1969, the University of Michigan’s Department of Zoology hired 
Stephen Hubbell fresh from his PhD. Hubbell’s lab ran lab experiments investigating 
competition in chemostats and developed competition-based models. Tilman took his first course 
in biology from Hubbell. Tilman relates that Hubbell impressed upon the ability for theorists to 
make progress in ecology (Davis 2004, Sprugel 2015). Hubbell left for the University of Iowa in 
1976, where he published several theoretical articles extending competition theory (Hansen and 
Hubbell 1980, Hsu, Hubbell, and Waltman 1978, Hsu, Hubbell, and Waltman 1977). Tilman 
stayed at the University of Michigan for his PhD where he continued doing chemostat 
experiments on algae, attempting to balance two populations by varying two nutrient levels 
(Tilman 1977). Here he developed MacArthur’s approach to competition theory into what would 
become R* Theory.  
In 1979, Hubbell published his first paper in tropical forest ecology. He had set up and 
censused a 13.44 hectare dry forest in Costa Rica, the first large scale census of tropical trees 
(Hubbell 1979). He had also developed the community drift model, based on drift and 
immigration and applied it to the new abundance data he collected. Then in 1980, Hubbell co-
founded the Forest Dynamics Plot (FDP) project at the Smithsonian Tropical Forest Research 
Institute on Barro Colorado Island (BCI), an island created with the Panama Canal. The project 
has completely censused a 50-hectare plot of old growth forest in 1982, 1985, and every 5 years 
since. Later, the BCI FDP became the flagship for the Center for Tropical Forest Science’s 
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Forest Global Earth Observatory that now includes over 60 plots throughout the tropics. The 
FDP continues to expand the data it collects. Hubbell published several more papers on the 
community drift model in the 80s before coming back to it in the mid-90s (Wright and Hubbell 
1983, Hubbell and Foster 1986, Hubbell 1995, 1997). All of Hubbell’s theoretical articles make 
use of BCI data, and it was a stated initial goal of the FDP to provide data to measure not only 
competitive processes but also demographic and dispersal processes (Hubbell and Foster 1982).  
The University of Minnesota hired Tilman in 1976. The University of Minnesota is home 
to the Cedar Creek Ecosystem Science Reserve, a 2,200 hectare reserve acquired by the 
University first in 1942 and incorporated into the national Long Term Ecological Research 
Network in 1982 (Reserve n.d.). Cedar Creek maintains 1100 long term experimental plots and 
2300 permanent observation plots and many short-term plots. Tilman has been involved with 
Cedar Creek since at least 1980 and has been its director since 1992. Tilman and others focus the 
reserve on, among many other topics: “mechanisms of plant competition for nutrients and light” 
and “modeling and ecological theory”. 
Both Hubbell’s Neutralism and Tilman’s Competitionism involve theoretical and 
observational/ experimental sub-programs that are both independent and intertwined. Neither the 
BCI FDP nor Cedar Creek is limited to investigating features of tropical forests or grasslands 
that can or may be predicted by Neutral Theory or R* Theory. In fact, both the BCI FDP and 
Cedar Creek might well have a more significant impact on ecology than either Neutral Theory or 
R* Theory. And yet we cannot understand the Neutralist or Competitionist programs without 
seeing that they are tied to these places and ways of generating data.  
A common criticism heard about Neutral Theory is that it is not surprising that it predicts 
the data from BCI, and other tropical forests, so well because it was after all constructed to 
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accommodate its extensive data sets. This concern expresses the rational worry that we need to 
evaluate a theory on systems beyond those used in its construction to gain evidence. However, 
three important things moderate this criticism. First, ecologists have compared Neutral Theory 
with data from many other kinds of communities. Many of them fit very well (in part because 
fitting SADS is easy), some of them do not. Second, Hubbell’s approach to theory building is a 
priori deductions from ecological principles, not a posteriori inductions from generalizations in 
data from BCI. And third, the comprehensive studies done in the BCI FDP permit us to evaluate 
the assumptions of the theory independently from their predictive consequences, an important 
source of support for theories (Lloyd 1994). Neutrality is approximately satisfied on BCI in the 
sense that of the 300 species of trees, there are only 12 guilds (Hubbell and Foster 1986, 318). A 
guild is a group of species that share the same niche and Hubbell and Foster argue that 
competitionism leads us to expect many, many more adaptive strategies. Independent evaluation 
of theoretical assumptions come from studying a system independently of the patterns used to 
test the theory.  
Hubbell has in turn criticized R* Theory for having too many free parameters (Hubbell et 
al.). Remember R* Theory requires 2 free parameters (population size and resource 
concentration) for every resource-species pair. This concern expresses the rational worry that the 
theory will never be tested to high accuracy for natural systems with large numbers of species 
like BCI. Measurements of each parameter would take enormous effort and without these 
independent measurements of the values, the model could fit most data well using parameter 
fitting procedures.  
However, again, this criticism must be tempered. First, tropical rain forests are an 
extreme case of resource and species diversity. Second, Tilman has confirmed R* Theory’s 
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predictions using simple chemostat experiments. And third, Tilman and others can measure the 
values of R* Theory’s free parameters in the grassland plots at Cedar Creek and make confirmed 
predictions. While Neutral Theory’s free parameters are about ecological rates, actually 
measuring dispersal and speciation rates in a way that can be used in the model is not yet 
possible. We cannot object to extrapolating from simple cases to complex cases in science 
without living with a vastly reduced scope of science.  
Hubbell and Tilman built their programs to satisfy distinct aims. Both study the domain 
of community ecology and are interested in explaining and predicting biodiversity. However, 
they differ in several ways. Hubbell is more interested in biogeography and Neutral Theory aims 
to explain spatial patterns along with abundance patterns using dispersal within a 
metacommunity. This serves the practical goal of advising in the design of natural preserves and 
immigration corridors. Tilman aims to explain resource-species correlations along with 
abundance patterns, something which will always be outside the scope of Neutral Theory. This 
serves the practical goal of predicting the changes in ranges due to climate change.  
To summarize, considered methodologically, we can compare the Neutralist and 
Competitionist programs on the following dimensions: 
 
 Competitionists Neutralists 
Domain Community Ecology Community Ecology 
Aims  Explaining and Predicting 
Biodiversity,  
Biogeography 
Advise Preserve Design 
Explaining and Predicting 
Biodiversity, 
Resource-Species Correlations 
Predict effects of climate 
change on ranges 
Home System BCI Tropical Forest Cedar Creek Grassland 
Experimental Strategy Natural Experiments Field Experiments 
Theoretical Starting Point Drift, Immigration, Speciation Interspecific Competition 
Reasoning Strategies Baseline Modeling 
Adding Complexity 
Baseline Modeling 
Adding Complexity 
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These two programs are integrated units organized and evolving to better suit the aims 
given the parts of the world investigated. Certain dimensions are foregrounded or backgrounded 
in different criticisms but criticizing one aspect of a program has repercussions with other 
aspects because of their mutual support. The controversy between them is not limited to any 
subset. 
We can see that the programs are integrated if we consider why Hubbell conducts natural 
experiments and Tilman conducts field experiments. Both Hubbell and Tilman began with 
laboratory experiments investigating patterns of coexistence and abundance. One reason Hubbell 
might have left is because he wanted to understand Abundance and Coexistence in natural 
communities and many ecologists believe that laboratory experiments do not generalize very far 
(Diamond 1986). Studying tropical forests through comparative natural experiments generalizes 
freely to other natural systems because the systems have not been controlled or simplified. 
Tilman moved to field experiments, which has a middling ability to generalize to natural 
communities. Their aim of understanding natural communities is further seen in the generality of 
both of their theories, neither being limited to particular types of communities such as plants.  
One fact facing both of these programs is that interspecific competition is difficult to 
measure in natural communities because the signal is weak and the background noise is high. In 
a tropical forest, dispersal and population sizes can be measured and they are known to be 
important causal factors. In grassland plots, manipulating nutrient ratios and controlling species 
diversity enables competition to be measured. The starting point of each program comprises the 
processes easiest to measure in their home system. These simple explanations for the 
coordination of the programs bring together all the features which a pragmatic understanding of 
scientific practice and programs sees as important: Scientists use tools and methods to 
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investigate aspects of the world for particular aims.  
Finally, I want to relate the unity of these programs to several long running divides within 
ecology. Ecology is a messy discipline in part because of its history and the diversity of the 
systems it studies. One important division in natural history was between the zoologists and the 
botanists. The study of marine invertebrates came about during the rise of ecology and fit 
together with the botanical tradition (Nyhart 2009, Steiner forthcoming 2019). As a broad 
generalization, ecologists studying animals have emphasized the roles of competition between 
species, while those studying plants and marine invertebrates inherited from Botany an emphasis 
on biogeography and the spatial distribution of organisms (Simberloff 1978, 174).6 One reason 
for this divide must be that animals can move while plants cannot, but the reasons must also 
include historical contingency and education. This fits the Neutralist program, but Tilman also 
studies plants. This points to another important divide in ecology.  
Most natural history involved only observation and comparative analysis. But other areas 
of biology and science developed experimental techniques for control and manipulation that 
were brought to ecology in the early 20th century (Inkpen 2017). Experimental ecology inherited 
from early exemplars such as Gause’s on yeast and Park’s on flour beetles an emphasis on 
investigating the effects of competition (Gause 1932, Park 1948). Observational ecology is more 
open to demographic and dispersal processes.  
We can call the third divide Reductionism vs. Emergentism about the organization of 
ecological research. Reductionism promotes the study of the diversity of nature and all of its 
particularities. Being fundamentally high-dimensional systems, reductionists investigate 
 
6 I thank Lynn Nyhart for discussing this issue with me. As should be expected, it is actually 
much more complicated both historically and contemporarily.  
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communities through studying the biology of particular species and their responses to other 
species and their environment. Competitionism’s Reductionism can be seen in how it explains 
species coexistence. As Marcel Weber showed in his treatment of Competition Theory, given the 
competitive exclusion principle, coexistence is a sign of relevant differences between species or 
differences in resources (Weber 1999). Only local knowledge of the organisms and systems can 
reveal the relevant differences. Neutralism’s Emergentism can be seen in its statistical approach 
to complex systems. Similarly to how the thermodynamics of gases is studied without reference 
to the particular of molecules, neutralists ignore species differences in favor of community-level 
properties like size and connections with other communities. One reason for the stability of 
Reductionism and Emergentism in ecology is that communities are at an intermediate level of 
complexity, between the scales at which either approach is best suited (Mittlebach and McGill 
forthcoming, Ch. 17).  
These divides are porous and all programs in ecology mix and match methods from 
different sides. But these research traditions remain a source of tension in a domain with such 
methodological diversity.  
 
5. Conclusion 
How we explain a scientific controversy reveals what we think is important and pressing 
in science. I have urged us to move beyond looking at only theories. Most research in ecology is 
short term and fragmented. The Neutralist and Competitionist programs are exceptional in their 
longevity and comprehensiveness. Their scope is due in large part to being integrated with the 
BCI FDP and Cedar Creek. These programs and their controversy functions as an exemplar for 
seeing the coordination of research programs. On a pragmatic understanding of science, the 
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controversy is rooted in the partial opposition of Neutralist and Competitionist, and also many 
other, research programs. 
Pragmatism sees the basic unit of analysis for science as: Scientists use tools and methods 
to investigate aspects of the world for particular aims. Including tools and methods moves 
beyond the focus on theories and models for representation emphasized most pragmatic accounts 
(Giere 1998, Odenbaugh 2005, Van Fraassen 2010). Scientists also use instruments for 
observation and experimentation as well as statistical techniques for generating evidence. 
Moreover, in scientific research programs, scientists choose and develop tools and techniques to 
suit their aims given the aspects of the world they are interested in. The pragmatic account of 
scientific practices is analogous to the better known account of meaning, where people use words 
to designate things for purposes (Peirce 1868, Morris 1938). Furthermore, it is analogous to how 
biologists understand organisms: Organisms use traits and behaviors to interact with parts of the 
environment for purposes.  
In an early and influential paper, John Dewey argued against the Reflex Arc concept in 
Psychology. The Reflex Arc working hypothesis explains actions as a response to a stimulus. 
Dewey argued that this duality is a remnant of the older duality of sensations and ideas and needs 
to be replaced by a view where stimulation and response form but one arc within a circuit of 
behavior unified in its usefulness for the preservation and reproduction of organisms as evolved 
by natural selection. For Dewey, stimulus and response are coordinated, and this coordination is 
the normal state of operation for organisms including ourselves.  
Thomas Kuhn exhorted an analogous change in our understanding of science (Kuhn 
1962). Instead of focusing on the arc of hypothesis and test, he urged the coordination of 
paradigms towards the goal of puzzle solving as the normal state. But while Kuhn and Lakatos 
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moved beyond the hypothesis testing arc, they did not move beyond theorizing and representing. 
The later move to foregrounding experimentation practices was a useful corrective but was itself 
an over-correction. The practice turn in the philosophy of science should be pro-theorizing, 
modeling, and experimenting together (Chang 2014, Waters 2014). And we should aim to 
understand how these practices are coordinated towards scientific aims in the evolution and 
ecology of research.  
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